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 Executive Summary 
 
Agglomerations, or “clusters,” of industries—and especially of high-technology 
industries—can be major sources of economic growth.  Policy makers therefore often search for 
ways to catalyze such clusters.  A popular approach is to establish a science or research park in 
the hopes that it will attract companies and fuel regional economic growth.  In this paper I 
assemble a county-level panel dataset to explore the effects of science parks on job growth and 
on venture capital.  Non-parametric and econometric analysis reveals no positive effect of 
science parks on regional development overall.  In other words, while success stories do exist, 
the analysis suggests that successes are the exception rather than the rule. Thus, policies intended 
to promote cluster development by subsidizing science or research parks are unlikely to be 
effective. 
   1
Do Science Parks Generate Regional Economic Growth? 






  Policy makers around the world are anxious to find tools that will help their regions 
attract high-tech jobs and become centers of innovation and new technology.  During the late 
1990s this meant trying to emulate Silicon Valley.  The dot-com crash put an end to those hopes, 
which have now morphed into a desire by officials in many regions to become biotech hubs.  For 
example, Florida announced plans in late 2003 to give more than $500 million in subsidies to the 
Scripps Research Institute to build a research facility in Palm Beach County; Virginia officials 
urged a county to give the Howard Hughes Medical Institute a break on property taxes to make 
the state appear biotech-friendly; and the city of Baltimore is hoping that a planned city-
subsidized plan will remake a run-down neighborhood into a thriving biotech center.
1  Local 
officials generally hope that with the right ingredients they can create a “cluster” of high-
technology activity that, in a virtuous circle, will attract more people and businesses. 
  Unfortunately, while we have learned a great deal about firm clustering, the composition 
of clusters like Silicon Valley, and the various components of successful high-tech regions, there 
is little empirical evidence on the effectiveness of public policies intended to start these clusters 
from scratch.  In this paper I use U.S. county-level panel data to investigate the effects of 
research parks on job growth and on venture capital.  I take two empirical approaches to test the 
regional effect of the parks.  First, I match counties with research parks to “similar” counties 
without parks and compare them over time (in the spirit of Goldstein and Luger (1991a), 
discussed below).  Second, I test econometrically the effect of establishing science parks.  I find 
no evidence that research parks had any measurable economic impact, suggesting that public 
subsidies to these ventures were not wise investments. 
 
                                                 
1  See Ulferts (2003) on Florida, Laris (2003) on Virginia, and Barbaro (2003) on Baltimore.    2
 
2. Industrial clustering 
 
  It is well known that many industries concentrate regionally (e.g., Krugman 1991a, 1998, 
Porter 2003) and that this clustering is greater than would be expected if geographic distributions 
were random (Ellison and Glaeser 1997).  Industry agglomeration is not limited to high-
technology sectors.  In the early nineteenth century, U.S. manufacturing was concentrated in a 
small part of the Northeast and the Midwest.  Historically, shoes were produced in Massachusetts 
and rubber in Akron, Ohio.  Carpet producers are still disproportionately located in Dalton, 
Georgia, and jewelry producers are Providence, Rhode Island (Krugman 1991a).  Today, high-
tech firms concentrate in areas like Silicon Valley. 
Alfred Marshall in 1920 hypothesized three reasons for industrial clustering: benefits of a 
pooled labor supply, access to specialized inputs, and information flows between people and 
firms.
2  These features may generate a positive feedback loop, in which firm concentration brings 
additional labor and other inputs, encouraging additional firm concentration, and so on (e.g., 
Arthur 1994, Krugman 1991b).  The specialized inputs required for industrial concentration 
differ by industry, of course.  It is by now conventional wisdom that universities and venture 
capital are necessary components of any high-tech agglomeration. 
Universities not only draw scientists and engineers to a region, but also generate 
knowledge that nearby firms can use.  Indeed, there is evidence of knowledge spillovers between 
firms and universities.  Jaffe (1989) finds that university research positively impacts patenting by 
firms in the same state.  Anselin, et al. (1997) find evidence of the same spillovers at a smaller 
regional level using a more sophisticated spatial analysis.  Saxenian (1994), meanwhile, 
documents the importance of knowledge transfer between Stanford University and firms in 
Silicon Valley.  The existence of these knowledge spillovers suggests that universities are 
important components in the virtual circle of high-tech agglomerations. 
Venture capital, too, is an important component of a high tech agglomeration.  Venture 
capitalists, though, may be as important as the capital itself, screening business plans and 
providing management advice to funded firms (Gompers and Lerner 1999). 
                                                 
2  Indeed, the study of regional economies and industrial clustering has experienced cyclical popularity over the past 
century (McCann and Sheppard 2003).   3
A large high-tech labor force, a combination of large firms and new start-ups, venture 
capital, venture capitalists, infrastructure that supports high tech needs (e.g., a good fiber optic 
network), and university connections are all important or perceived as important components of 
high tech regions.  This observation often leads to the view that these are just “ingredients” that, 
once in place, will generate a new Silicon Valley or biotech hub.  Some of these ingredients may 
appear amenable to quick policy interventions and are attractive to politicians who want to 
promote regional economic development and desire immediately visible outcomes.  Policy 
makers sometimes believe that they might be able to create a nucleus of, and catalyst for, such a 
cluster by helping establish a science or research park.  
 
Research Parks 
Research parks remain popular.  The Association of University Research Parks (AURP) 
counted 135 parks in the U.S. as 
members in its 1998 directory, 
while the International Association 
of Science Parks has members in 82 
countries outside the U.S.
3  B y  
2003, the AURP had more than 200 
members.  Figure 1 shows the 
growth in the number of science 
parks in the U.S. from the first 
parks in the 1950s through the end 
of the 20
th century.
4  Felsenstein 
(1994) notes that science parks are 
                                                 
3  AURP defines a research park as “a property-based venture which has: Existing or planned land and buildings 
designed primarily for private and public research and development facilities, high technology and science based 
companies, and support services; a contractual and/or formal ownership or operational relationship with one or more 
universities or other institutions of higher education, and science research; a role in promoting research and 
development by the university in partnership with industry, assisting in the growth of new ventures, and promoting 
economic development; [and] a role in aiding the transfer of technology and business skills between the university 
and industry tenants.” See http://www.aurrp.org/whatis/index.html (accessed January 8, 2004).  The International 
Association of Science Parks lists countries in which it has members and other information: 
http://www.iaspworld.org/ (accessed January 8, 2004). 
 
4  The number of parks that closed, if any, is not clear.  The organizations that track parks are also advocacy groups 
and are not eager to highlight failures.  
Figure 1 
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generally established with two primary objectives.  The first objective is “to play an incubator 
role, nurturing the development and growth of new, small, high tech firms, facilitating the 
transfer of university know-how to tenant companies, encouraging the development of faculty-
based spinoffs and stimulating the development of innovative products and processes.” The 
second objective is to be a catalyst for regional economic development—a “growth sector 
leading the area . . . into a spiral of propulsive expansion.” 
Most science parks receive some form of public subsidy. Goldstein and Luger (1991a) 
note, “many parks are public corporations or subsidiaries of public universities.  Others are 
privately owned but may receive various types of government subsidies including land, 
buildings, services and infrastructure, and property tax reductions.  Less direct government 
subsidies to science/technology parks can be through the provision of specially designed 
economic development, education, and job training programs, at the state level, and through 
favorable land-use policies which favor expansion, at the local level.”  Notably absent from the 
literature on science parks, however, is any real discussion of their costs or estimates of public 
expenditures on them. 
Some science parks have been successful.  The Research Triangle Park (RTP) in North 
Carolina, for example, has been considered a success for some time (e.g., Braun and McHone 
1992, Goldstein and Luger 1991b).  RTP currently hosts 38,500 full-time employees and 131 
organizations.
5  Success stories like this, along with a few others such as the Stanford Research 
Park in the heart of Silicon Valley, encourage others to build parks in the hopes of emulating that 
success.  Even if a science park itself is successful, however, that success may not spill over into 
the local economy.  While the Research Triangle region now exhibits many features of a high 
tech area,
6 RTP had not stimulated a regional technology cluster even by the early 1990s, despite 
having been established in 1959 (Braun and McHone 1992). 
Success stories like RTP seem to be more the exception than the rule.  For example, San 
Antonio broke ground on its Texas Research Park in the mid-1980s among predictions of hosting 
50,000 jobs and generating another 100,000 spinoff jobs within 30 years (Haines-Saine 1985).  
While it has not been that long yet, it does not look promising: about 300 jobs so far (Hundley 
                                                 
5  S e e  http://www.rtp.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page&filename=facts_and_figures_fact_sheet.html (accessed 
January 8, 2004). 
6  See, for example, Hillner (2000) who ranked the Research Triangle among the 46 “locations [in the world] that 
matter most in the new digital geography” in the July 2000 issue of Wired.   5
2003).  A research park established in Prince George’s County, Maryland, in the mid-1980s 
promised 12,000 jobs on the park and 25,000 related spinoff jobs (PR Newswire 1988).  A local 
council member recently called that park a “failure,” and the state of Maryland wants a refund on 
some of the millions of dollars it invested in the site’s infrastructure (Wilen 2003). 
A possible explanation for the few examples of “science park-led local economic 
development” (Felsenstein 1994), is that, as Jowitt (1991) observes, research parks are often just 
a political quick fix to industrial decline.  Indeed, policy makers in regions experiencing 
economic downturns (either absolutely or relative to other regions) are likely to face pressure to 
generate economic development.  A science park may be a politically attractive option since it 
can be constructed relatively quickly, generating at least an appearance of economic 
development activity.  It can further generate an appearance of success when firms move into the 
park.  Cities and research park organizations routinely count as “success” any firms or 
employment in the park, with no regard to whether that economic activity was new to the region 
or simply relocated into the park, and no analysis of whether that activity would have been likely 
to occur without the park.  Moreover, as noted above, the costs of the park (many of which might 
be hidden, such as the opportunity cost of the land) are rarely calculated.  In other words, cost-
benefit analyses of research parks are likely to count as benefits any economic activity in the 
park regardless of whether it is, in fact, a net benefit, and ignore the costs altogether. 
In order to generate economic growth, a science park would have to encourage firm 
growth that would not have happened without the park or generate spillovers that would 
otherwise be absent.
7  The first criteria would be difficult and data-intensive to answer; to my 
knowledge no study explores it comprehensively.  Still, some research explores differences 
between firms on and off science parks, and other research explores potential links between 
parks and their surrounding communities.  A small body of additional research looks for regional 
effects of these parks. 
There is some evidence that firms located in science parks differ from firms located 
outside the parks (but in the same region).  Braun and McHone (1992), for example, found that 
firms in the Central Florida Research Park were more likely to be branch plants than firms 
outside the park.  Ferguson (1999) found that firms in Swedish science parks tended to be 
younger and smaller than firms outside the park.  But differences between firms on and off the 
                                                 
7   And in a global sense, the park has an impact only if firms do not simply relocate from one place to another.   6
parks are to be expected and by itself this phenomenon is difficult to interpret.  Parks may have 
selection or investment criteria, for example, ensuring that they host only particular types of 
firms.  While the selection mechanism or incentives offered may attract particular types of firms, 
the differences among firms, per se, does not imply an economic effect of the park. 
Most research finds little, if any, real effects of research parks.  Felsenstein (1994) finds 
little evidence that firms in science parks engage in more research, have stronger linkages to 
universities, or witness greater transfers between other local firms than do firms not located in 
science parks.  Indeed, he concludes that the evidence suggests “parks may function as ‘islands’ 
of innovation or as collections of firms with no real links between them.”  Braun and McHone 
(1992) note a lack of linkages between firms in science parks and local economic actors outside 
the park.  Spillovers to the larger region are probably less likely without such linkages. 
While the results discussed above suggest it is unlikely that science parks have positive 
regional effects, there is scant evidence on this matter. Goldstein and Luger (1991b) provide the 
only evidence to date on this score.  They matched U.S. counties with science parks to “similar” 
counties without science parks and compared total county employment growth rates before and 
after the park was established.  Of the 45 parks in their sample 32 were in counties that grew 
faster than the matched counties, and 26 of the 45 grew more than 20 percent faster than the 
matched counties.  Still, it is difficult to interpret these results since the analysis—despite the 
matched sample—does not control for other factors that could influence economic growth, and 
the authors provide little information on how they chose their control counties. 
I build on this work by updating and greatly expanding the dataset to include far more 
measures of a high-tech economy over a longer period of time.  In addition, I conduct more 
rigorous econometric tests that attempt to control for reasons parks may have been established in 




The county-level data I analyze in this paper come from a variety of sources and cover 
1988-1997, though the time period covered varies by data source.  Venture Capital data comes 
from VentureXpert, a database compiled by Venture Economics.
8  Again, these data are provided 
                                                 
8   See Gompers and Lerner (Gompers and Lerner 1999) for a description of the Venture Economics data.   7
at the firm level, along with address and deal amount.  The VC data includes information from 
1983 through 1999.  University data comes from the National Science Foundation’s CASPAR 
database.  This database provides information on all U.S. universities, including an address.  The 
firm and university addresses allow me to aggregate this data into counties.
9 
Employment data and firm counts by industry come from the U.S. Census Bureau County 
Business Patterns.  While I have this industry data back to 1986, the 1987 changes to the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) mean that time series analyses using these data should 
begin in 1988.  Population estimates, government and military employment, and per capita 
income are available from the Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional 
Economic Information System (REIS).  I have these data from 1983-1997.  These sources all 
provide data at the county level. 
The policy variable of interest in this paper is whether a county established a research or 
science park.  This information comes from the Association of University Research Parks, which 
compiled this information in its 1998 directory.  A park may affect a region in many ways, but I 
look at three in particular: high-tech employment, firms, and venture capital.  I discuss these in 
more detail below. 
 
High-tech Firms and Employment 
  Because one objective of this paper is to look for impacts on regional technology 
development, I need a measure of employment in technology-related industries in addition to 
total employment.  County Business Patterns provides data down to the four-digit SIC level, 
allowing me to construct such a measure.  As many authors have noted, however, at least two 
problems arise in defining “technology industries.”  The first is simply that the term itself is 
ambiguous.  Almost all industries use and even develop advanced technology to some extent, 
making any definition of “high-tech” at least somewhat arbitrary.  The second is that the 
Standard Industrial Classifications, even at the four-digit level, are fairly crude and do not 
accurately classify firms—especially large, multiproduct firms.  Nonetheless, following other 
authors, it is possible to construct a crude definition of technology firms. 
                                                 
9   I employed a computerized geographic information system (GIS) to aggregate firm and university data into 
counties.  The GIS reads in the observation’s zip code and matches it to the county containing that zip code.  
Occasionally zip codes overlap counties; in these cases the GIS uses the centroid of the zip code to identify a county.   8
I begin with DeVol’s (1999) definition, which “includes industries that spend an above-
average amount of revenue on research 
and development and that employ an 
above-average number of technology-
using occupations—such as scientists, 
engineers, mathematicians, and 
programmers.”  Table 1 lists the 
industries that comprise “high-tech” in 
this paper.
10  While a reasonable 
definition, it includes many industries 
that deal primarily with military 
research and manufacturing (e.g., 
guided missiles).   
Military spending has 
historically had a large impact on 
technology development—both in the 
technological direction and geographic location of R&D.  However, changes in employment 
related to military R&D are driven largely by exogenous factors—the end of the Cold War, for 
example, brought about dramatic reductions in all areas of military spending, while the war on 
terrorism and in Iraq are now increasing military spending.  While the effects of changes in 
military-related employment are interesting to study, including those changes in an aggregate 
measure of employment clouds the picture of regional changes in technology employment. 
  I thus calculate an alternate measure of high-tech employment excluding three industries: 
aircraft and parts (SIC 372), guided missiles and space vehicles (SIC 376), and search, detection, 
navigation, and guidance equipment (SIC 381).  This variable should measure non-military high-
tech employment. 
 
                                                 
10   DeVol’s (1999) definition also includes SIC 781, motion pictures and allied services.  I exclude this industry 
from my analysis because it seems to have been included in the DeVol study largely because of its concentration in 





357 Computer and Office Equipment
366 Communications Equipment
367 Electronic Components and Accessories
372 Aircraft and Parts
376 Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles
381 Search, Detection, Navigation, and Guidance
382 Laboratory Apparatus
384 Surgical, Medical, and Dental Instruments
481 Telephone Communications
737 Computer Programming & Data Processing
871 Engineering, Architectural, and Surveying
873 Research, Development, and Testing
Industries in italics (372, 276, 381) excluded from some
calculations to remove effects of military spending.    9
Venture capital 
As mentioned above, the venture capital data comes from Venture Economics, which 
collects and disseminates data for the National Venture Capital Association.  Because “venture 
capital” is, in general, so difficult to define, aggregated estimates of VC funding can differ 
depending on the source of the data.  Venture Economics has one of the broadest definitions of 
“venture capital,” including not only venture funds but also “other private equity funds.”
11  The 
result is that Venture Economics data yields the largest estimates of aggregate VC funding.  For 
example, Venture Economics reported total venture funding in 1998 of $19.2 billion, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers reported $14.2 billion, and VentureOne reported $12.5 billion.
12  
Fortunately, while levels differ by source, changes over time and differences across regions do 
not.  As such, an analysis that makes use of the variance across time and regions, as this paper 
does, should not be greatly affected by data source.
13  Nonetheless, I partially address this issue 
by removing from the VentureEconomics data all “non-high technology” (i.e., those listed as 
“consumer-related” or “other”).  This deletion brings the VC data closer to other estimates (the 
1998 total drops to $17.2 billion) and is more in line with the technology focus of this paper.   
 
4. Empirical tests 
 
  Investigating the effects of relatively small policy interventions is difficult with 
aggregated data—even at the county level.  I take two different approaches for exploring the 
data.  While problems exist with each approach, the similarity of the results lends some 
robustness to the final conclusions. 
First, I match “treatment” counties—those that built research parks—with similar 
counties without the policy intervention and compare changes in high-tech employment and 
venture capital over time.  While matching counties in this way is imprecise at best, it provides a 
                                                 




http://www.ventureone.com/research/venturedata/stats/q498news.htm for the Venture Economics, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and VentureOne data, respectively. 
13   Unfortunately, I cannot test this claim rigorously.  Venture Capital data is costly, and using it labor-intensive, 
making it extremely difficult to directly compare all the sources.   10
first rough cut of the effects of these policy prescriptions.  Second, I conduct a more rigorous 
regression analysis. 
The first approach to exploring the effects of science parks is to match counties that built 
parks to similar counties that did not, much in the spirit of Goldstein and Luger (1991b).  My 
analysis differs from theirs, however, in several ways.  First, they looked only at changes in total 
county employment, while I look at high-tech employment and also venture capital.  Second, I 
define “similar” in a precise way, while how they chose matches is not clearly defined.  Finally, 
a decade has passed since they completed their work; it is time for an update. 
  For each county that built a research park, I attempted to identify similar counties that did 
not.
14  I considered a county to be a control if its population, high tech employment, and venture 
capital were all within 30 percent of the levels for the treatment county in the year that it built the 
park.  This definition yielded matches for 41 counties that opened parks from 1986 onwards 
(though because of the SIC changes I compare employment changes only for the 26 counties that 
opened a park in 1988 or later).  Several counties yielded only one match, while one county, 
Gallatin, Montana, with its Advanced Technology Park, yielded 147 matches. 
  Appendix tables 1 and 2 show high-tech employment and venture capital, respectively, in 
the treatment and control counties in the year the park was established and five years later.  The 
tables reveal little difference between the groups.  The number of high-tech jobs increased, on 
average, from 5814 to 6283 in the 27 treatment counties, and from 5184 to 6723 in the control 
counties. Venture capital increased from about $5.7 million to $6.8 million on average in the 41 
treatment counties, and from about $5.0 million to $10.9 million in the control counties.  Nine of 
the treatment counties ended up with more venture capital than their controls, and in eight cases 
both the treatment and control counties attracted no venture capital. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show means from five years before and to five years after park 
establishment for high tech employment and venture capital, respectively.  The nature of the data 
means that each data point in the graphs cannot, unfortunately, be calculated over the same 
sample size.  My employment data begins in 1988, meaning that I have no pre-park data when 
the park was established that year (and only one year of pre-park data when the park was 
established in 1989, and so on).  Likewise, my data stops in 1997, meaning that I have no 
information for time t+5 for treatment counties and their controls after 1992 (and no information 
                                                 
14  Because my data starts in 1986, the analysis excludes any county that built a park before that year.     11
for time t+4 after 1993, and so on).   
Despite their statistical shortcomings, the 
figures strongly suggest no substantial 
differences between the treatment 
counties and their controls. 
While the tables and figures are 
compelling, they are not, by themselves, 
entirely convincing.  In addition to the 
data issues discussed above, matching 
counties based on a few variables cannot 
control for the many other ways in which 
counties differ.  To look at this question 
more rigorously I estimate equation (1) 
below, first only with the counties that 
established parks to investigate the before-after effects of the park, and then including the control 
counties. 
 
(1)  Yit = β0 + γt + αj + 
β1*(Science park dummyit) + 
β2Z + εit 
 
I estimate Equation (1) three 
times, each time using a different 
dependent variable.  I first define Yit 
as high-tech non-military employment 
in county i in year t, next as venture 
capital in the county-year, and finally 
as the number of small high-tech 
firms in the county-year.  The science 
park dummy equals one if there is a 
science park in that county-year, and 
Figure 2 
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   12
zero otherwise.  Z is a vector of independent variables that are potentially important components 
of regional development.  Continuous independent variables that vary across county and time 
include university R&D spending, personal income, non high-tech employment, the number of 
large high-tech firms not primarily engaged in military activities, and the number of large high-
tech firms engaged primarily in military related activities, where “large” is defined as a firm with 
more than 500 employees.  Finally, I control for year (γt) and county (αj) fixed effects.  I explain 
the rationale for each variable’s inclusion below. 
Considerable evidence suggests that universities are important components of a region’s 
economy.  For example, Jaffe (1989) finds spillovers from university research at the state level, 
while Saxenian (1994) notes Stanford’s key role in Silicon Valley.  I include university R&D 
spending in the county both to control for the presence of a research university and also to test 
their effects in this context.  Personal income proxies for wealth and cost of living.  Non high-
tech employment controls for general (non high-tech) economic conditions and size of the labor 
force. 
I include counts of large high-tech firms since they are important determinants of 
regional technology development but are less likely than small firms to move to a region because 
of a science park.
15  Indeed, newer research parks (those that opened in the time period in this 
sample) aim to attract primarily small high-tech firms.  Several authors have noted the 
importance of the initial conditions in determining the growth trajectory of a region (e.g., Arthur 
1994, Krugman 1995).  The county fixed effects help control for such initial conditions as well 
as county specific, but otherwise unobserved, features that are likely to affect technological 
development.  Year fixed effects control for time trends, which could otherwise contribute to 
spurious correlations.   
                                                 
15   With some exceptions, of course.  RTP now hosts several large firms, including Glaxo Wellcome and IBM.  
However, RTP is an exception as one of the few very large and successful parks.   13
Tables 2 and 3 highlight the results of this analysis.  Table 2 shows the results when 
estimating the equation using only the counties that established science parks in order to get a 
sense of the before-after effects.   
Within these counties, the analysis 
reveals that the number of large 
non-military firms is positively and 
significantly correlated with high-
tech employment, negatively and 
significantly correlated with high-
tech venture capital, and not 
statistically correlated with the 
number of small high-tech firms.   
The number of large military-
focused firms is weakly positively 
correlated with the number of small 
high-tech firms.  The number of 
government employees in the 
county is positively correlated with 
the number of high-tech jobs, 
negatively correlated with venture 
capital, and positively correlated with the number of small high-tech firms. 
The coefficient of interest is on the research park dummy variable.  Recall that in this 
case the dummy variable equals zero before the county established the park and one afterwards.  
The coefficient, while negative, is not statistically significant, suggesting that establishing the 
science park had no measurable impact on the number of high-tech jobs, venture capital, or the 
number of small firms in the county. 
Table 2 
Science parks and high-tech employment









mean of dependent var: 9226 5338 307
Science park? -110.118 -967.370 -11.945
(0.26) (0.55) (1.41)
University R&D spending 0.005 0.009 0.000
(0.77) (0.32) (0.74)
non-tech employment 0.001 0.164 0.0008
(0.19) (5.23)** (2.64)**
personal income 0.788 1.260 0.060
(11.06)** (4.33)** (42.65)**
num large non-military firms 818.167 -1,589.503 2.614
(6.19)** (2.94)** (1.01)
num large military firms -662.339 -2,009.042 16.476
(1.57) (1.17) (1.99)*
government employment 0.223 -0.789 0.008
(5.38)** (4.65)** (10.03)**
Constant -11,368.250 6,586.608 -649.597
(4.78)** (0.68) (13.92)**
Observations 672 672 672
R-squared 0.38 0.20 0.90
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year and county fixed effects included in all regressions    14
Table 3 incorporates the control 
counties, which allows us to compare 
how the science park counties performed 
relative to the other counties once they 
established their parks.  In this case the 
table shows that university R&D 
spending has a positive and statistically 
significant correlation with the number of 
high-tech jobs and the number of small 
high-tech firms, consistent with research 
that has demonstrated local spillovers of 
university research. 
The science park dummy variable 
here turns out to be statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with 
the number of high-tech jobs and venture 
capital.  It is positively correlated with 
the number of small firms, but is not statistically significant.  In other words, the results here 
suggest that counties that established science parks actually did worse—on average and all else 
equal—than the counties that did not establish the parks.  In sum, the econometric results match 
the nonparametric results: there is scant evidence that establishing a research park aided regional 




  Industrial clusters of economic activity are real and can be major sources of economic 
growth.  While this has been true for a long time, since the 1980s clusters of high-technology 
activity have gotten the most attention, culminating in the late 1990s with a focus on Silicon 
Valley and today on biotech hubs like San Diego.  Politicians are attracted to the idea of 
clustering because they are attracted by the idea that with the right “ingredients” their region can 
Table 3 
Science parks and high-tech employment










mean of dependent variable 1788 862 74
Science park? -882.951 -4,081.143 2.139
(7.63)** (7.84)** (0.78)
University R&D spending 0.008 0.010 0.001
(4.93)** (1.32) (15.93)**
non-tech employment 0.011 0.125 0.001
(5.41)** (14.03)** (15.85)**
personal income 0.648 1.116 0.055
(36.98)** (14.18)** (132.76)**
num large non-military firms 847.653 -29.152 5.462
(30.31)** (0.23) (8.28)**
num large military firms -311.038 -94.156 7.105
(4.44)** (0.30) (4.30)**
government employment 0.091 -0.647 0.005
(8.84)** (13.99)** (20.14)**
Constant -2,027.551 -296.348 -169.404
(15.73)** (0.51) (55.72)**
Observations 8181 8181 8181
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 4 00 . 1 20 . 8 6
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year and county fixed effects included in all regressions    15
become another such cluster.  One common technique for trying to catalyze such growth is to 
establish or subsidize a research park. 
  This paper uses a host of county-level panel data to test whether such plans tend to be 
effective.  This paper is not, of course, the final answer.  Investigating all the effects of science 
parks requires data disaggregated below the county level.  A more detailed analysis would 
determine whether firms and other organizations moved into the park (which might be an 
indicator of park success), whether they simply moved from one location within the region to 
another (which would mean no net regional impact), and—importantly—calculate the costs of 
the park. 
  Nonetheless, this analysis suggests that establishing a research park tends to have no net 
impact on job growth, the number of firms, or on the amount of venture capital attracted to the 
county.  That is, while there are successful research parks, they seem to be the exception rather 
than the rule.  These results are consistent with Porter’s (2003) conclusion that it is difficult to 
start new regional clusters from scratch.  While high tech clusters can be major sources of 
economic growth, and industrial clustering is common, the results in this paper suggest that 
research parks are not, in general, likely to help generate one, and that subsidies spent on them 
are likely to be ineffective.   16
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